Citation: 320 Neb. 675
Docket Number: S-25-137 through S-25-141
Summary:
In 5 different cases, the separate juvenile court of Sarpy County entered postdispositional orders pursuant to §43-2,106.03, finding that an adjudicated juvenile was not amenable to rehabilitative services and further ordering that the juvenile’s probation and the court’s jurisdiction be “terminated unsuccessfully.” In these consolidated appeals, the juvenile challenges the court’s finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03 and its termination of probation and jurisdiction based on that finding. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirms the juvenile court’s finding of nonamenability but concludes it was plain error for the juvenile court to change the dispositional orders based solely on such finding. The Supreme Court affirms the orders in part, and in part vacates the orders and remands the causes to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
Background:
At the age of 14, Johnny H. was adjudicated in a truancy case and subsequently placed on an indefinite term of probation. In the years that followed, he was adjudicated in 4 separately docketed delinquency cases and placed on indefinite terms of probation in each case. It does not appear from the appellate record that Johnny appealed from any of the original dispositional orders. In January 2025, while Johnny was still on juvenile probation in all 5 cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint against him in the county court for Sarpy County, charging attempted robbery. One week later, the State filed identical motions in all 5 pending juvenile cases. The motions sought a finding, pursuant to §43-2,106.03, that Johnny was not amenable to rehabilitative services available under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The motions also asked the court to terminate jurisdiction in each juvenile case as unsuccessful.
43-2,106.03 provides: Any time after the disposition of a juvenile described in subdivision (1), (2), (3)(b), or (4) of section 43-247, upon the motion of any party or the court on its own motion, a hearing may be held regarding the amenability of the juvenile to the rehabilitative services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The court may enter an order, based upon evidence presented at the hearing, finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The reasons for such a finding shall be stated in the order. Such an order shall be considered by the county attorney in making a future determination under section 43-276 regarding such juvenile and by the court when considering a future transfer motion under section 29-1816 or 43-274 or any future charge or petition regarding such juvenile.
1. Nonamenability Hearing
In January 2025, the juvenile court held a consolidated hearing on the State’s §43-2,106.03 motions. The only witness called by the State was Johnny’s probation officer, who testified about
the rehabilitative services Johnny had been provided over the years, how Johnny responded to those services, and which community-based services remained available to Johnny. The court also received into evidence selected pleadings, orders, evaluations, and reports from all 5 of Johnny’s juvenile court cases, as well as a certified copy of the felony criminal complaint and the affidavit of probable cause filed in the county court.
(a) Truancy Adjudication
In June 2022, a juvenile petition was filed against Johnny in the Sarpy County Separate Juvenile Court alleging he was habitually truant from school. Johnny admitted the allegations and was adjudicated under §43-247(3)(b). After a dispositional hearing, he was placed on juvenile probation “for an open ended period of time” and was ordered to attend school daily, participate in rehabilitative services, cooperate with a community youth coach, and participate in prosocial activities.
(b) Theft Adjudication
In December 2023, while Johnny was still on probation in the truancy case, a delinquency petition was filed in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court alleging 2 counts: that Johnny committed an act which would constitute assault in the third degree and that he had committed an act which would constitute theft by unlawful taking in an amount less than $500. In February 2024, Johnny admitted the theft allegation and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the assault allegation was dismissed. He was adjudicated pursuant to §43-247(1), and the case was transferred to the Sarpy County juvenile court. After a dispositional hearing, Johnny was placed on probation “for an open ended period of time” and was ordered to comply with the probation order in the truancy case. He was also ordered to complete summer school and to complete an anger management program.
(c) Assault Adjudication
In July 2024, another juvenile petition was filed in the Douglas County Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had committed an act which would constitute assault in the third degree by mutual consent. Johnny was adjudicated pursuant to §43-247(1) and the case was transferred to the Sarpy County juvenile court. After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Johnny to remain on probation “for an open ended period of time” and to comply with all previous probationary orders.
(d) Second Theft Adjudication
In August 2024, another juvenile petition was filed in the Sarpy County Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had committed an act which would constitute burglary and an act which would constitute theft by unlawful taking ($500 to $1,500). Prior to adjudication, the court ordered that Johnny be detained at the Juvenile Justice Center in Sarpy County based on a finding that “the physical safety of persons within the community would be seriously threatened if he were not detained today.”
In September 2024, Johnny was released from detention and placed in a shelter, but he lost that placement 1 week later when he was cited for a new law violation. As an alternative to detention, Johnny was released to his father and placed in the custody of the Sarpy County sheriff for participation in the “C.A.R.E.” program.
At Johnny’s adjudication hearing in November 2024, he admitted the theft allegation, and the State dismissed the burglary allegation pursuant to a plea agreement. Johnny was adjudicated pursuant to §43-247(2), and, after a dispositional hearing, he was ordered to remain on juvenile probation “for an open ended period of time,” subject to the terms and conditions of the prior probationary orders.
(e) Robbery Adjudication
In October 2024, a petition was filed in the Sarpy County Separate Juvenile Court alleging Johnny had committed an act which would constitute the felony of robbery. Johnny admitted the allegations and was adjudicated pursuant to §43-247(2). After a dispositional hearing, the court ordered that Johnny continue on probation “for an open ended period of time,” subject to the terms and conditions of the prior probationary orders.
(f) Probation Revocation
In October 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, alleging that Johnny had violated the probation order by receiving a citation for “refusing to comply with a lawful order” and “getting into an altercation with another youth and assaulting a staff member in the process.” Johnny admitted the allegations of an amended motion to revoke, and the court accepted his admission and found he had violated his probation. After a dispositional hearing in December 2024, the court ordered Johnny to continue on probation “subject to previous terms and conditions…for an open ended period of time.”
(g) Felony Criminal Case
In January 2025, the State filed a criminal complaint against Johnny in the county court for Sarpy County, charging attempted robbery. The affidavit of probable cause stated that a 17-year-old victim was approached at a party by Johnny, who demanded $20. When the victim refused, Johnny demanded the victim’s coat and neck chain. When the victim again refused, Johnny struck the victim multiple times in the face and continued to hit and kick the victim after he fell to the ground. The victim sustained significant bruising and swelling to his face, eyes, and nose. Johnny was detained on the felony charge, but he bonded out and was again placed in the C.A.R.E. program as an alternative to detention. The current status of his felony case is not reflected in the appellate record.
(h) Probation Officer’s Testimony
Johnny’s juvenile probation officer, Nathan Bohy, was the only witness to testify at the hearing on the State’s §43-2,106.03 motions. In addition to the evidence described above, Bohy summarized the rehabilitative services provided to Johnny in juvenile court since 2022 and
Johnny’s response to those services. The court made an express finding that Bohy’s testimony was credible.
Bohy testified that out-of-home placements had been explored but that multiple shelter placements had been denied because of Johnny’s criminal charges and his aggressive behaviors. Regarding compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation, Bohy also testified that Johnny had not completed the anger management program, explaining that he was removed from the program for lack of attendance, but was scheduled to restart the program in February 2025 “if he’s still on probation.” Johnny had been ordered to attend therapy throughout his time on probation, but his attendance was sporadic.
Bohy acknowledged that Johnny had complied with some conditions of his probation, noting that he successfully completed meetings with two community youth coaches and regularly engaged in prosocial activities. Bohy also testified that when Johnny started juvenile probation, his school credits were significantly deficient but that he was almost up to grade level and was on track to graduate from high school.
In sum, Bohy testified that Johnny had completed some probation conditions but had failed to complete others. While on probation and receiving services, Johnny continued to violate the law, noting that after successfully completing the C.A.R.E. program he picked up new criminal charges less than 1 month later. And although Johnny’s school attendance had improved, he was frequently late and was serving a suspension at the time of the hearing.
Bohy was asked if there were any other services that Johnny would be amenable to. Bohy replied that the only services “left on the table that Johnny has not been a part of would be in-home services through Boys Town or [multi-systemic therapy],” which Bohy described as the last effort to keep the youth in the community and in the home environment. But Bohy testified that he did not think these services would be effective for Johnny, and he could not think of any additional services that would help Johnny to rehabilitate in the Juvenile Court.
In addition to his testimony, Bohy authored a supervision report that was received into evidence without objection. Bohy reported that at the time of the hearing, Johnny was out on bond in his criminal case and was placed back in the C.A.R.E. program. Bohy’s report and a memorandum from an employee of the Juvenile Justice Center indicated Johnny had not progressed beyond the first level of the program because he was testing positive for THC and because empty alcohol bottles and THC vapes were found in his bedroom. Bohy’s report and the memorandum stated that Johnny had been suspended from school twice in January 2025, for a verbal altercation and for leaving school grounds without permission. Johnny did not offer any exhibits at the hearing and did not call any witnesses.
2. Nonamenability Finding and Order
At the conclusion of the evidence, and considering the parties’ arguments, the court announced its findings from the bench and later memorialized those findings in written orders. After the
court remarked on the felony charge of attempted robbery that had been filed in the county court, it noted that Johnny had been in juvenile court for over 2 years and resources had been exhausted. The court concluded that based on the prior adjudications, the services attempted, and the totality of the circumstances, Johnny was not amenable to services in the Juvenile Court. The court terminated his probation and ordered his record not to be sealed. The court’s oral ruling was memorialized in written orders in all five juvenile cases.
Johnny filed timely notices of appeal in all five juvenile cases, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals for briefing and disposition. The Nebraska Supreme Court moved the consolidated appeals to its docket on its own motion to address several issues of first impression relating to the proper construction and application of §43-2,106.03.
Assignments of Error:
Johnny assigns that the juvenile court erred in (1) finding he was not amenable to rehabilitative services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code and (2) terminating probation and jurisdiction based on that finding.
Analysis:
One of the many statutory factors a court must consider when determining whether to transfer a case involving a juvenile is “whether a juvenile court order has been issued for the juvenile pursuant to §43-2,106.03.” The Court notes there are no published appellate opinions construing or applying the provisions of §43-2,106.03. Because these consolidated appeals present the first opportunity to consider such orders, the Court requested supplemental briefing on several issues, including: (1) what legal standard juvenile courts should apply to determine amenability under §43-2,106.03; (2) who bears the burden of proof when a motion is made pursuant to §43-2,106.03 and what quantum of proof is required to carry that burden; and (3) when an order is issued pursuant to §43-2,106.03 finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative services, is the juvenile court authorized to change the disposition based on such finding?
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. Here, both parties describe the orders of nonamenability as “final orders,” but neither party explains why that is so, and the Court has not previously addressed the issue.
§43-2,106.01(1) authorizes appeals from “any final order or judgment entered by a juvenile court…” No one contends the orders at issue rendered a judgment, and because the Court consistently describes proceedings before a juvenile court as special proceedings for appellate purposes, the threshold jurisdictional question is whether the juvenile court’s orders of nonamenability were orders “affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding” within the meaning of §25-1902(1)(b). A “substantial right” is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on that
right must also be substantial. Whether the effect of an order is substantial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter.
Here, when determining if the orders affected a substantial right with finality, it is significant that those orders did more than just find that Johnny was not amenable to rehabilitative services under §43-2,106.03. The orders also changed the disposition in each case by directing that “Johnny’s probation and the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter be and same is hereby terminated unsuccessfully.” Later in this opinion, the Court addresses whether a juvenile court has the authority to modify a dispositional order based solely on a finding of nonamenability. But for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction, the Court concludes that because the orders at issue effectively changed the disposition in each juvenile case, they affected a substantial right and did so with the type of finality required to create a final, appealable order under §25-1902(1)(b). The Court expresses no opinion on whether an order that contains only a finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03, but does not modify the disposition, would be a final order.
Having confirmed that appellate jurisdiction exists on this record, the Court turns to the merits of Johnny’s assignments of error. He challenges both the juvenile court’s finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03 and its reliance on that finding to terminate his probation and terminate the court’s jurisdiction.
2. Construing §43-2,106.03
When construing a statute, a court’s analysis always begins with the text; statutory language is given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Courts must also determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. It is the court’s duty to discover, if possible, legislative intent from the statute itself. A court must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves its purpose.
In addition to these settled general principles of statutory interpretation, there are certain principles that apply when a court is construing statutes under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The Legislature has directed that statutes within the juvenile code should be construed to effectuate certain goals, including, “to remove juveniles who are within the Nebraska Juvenile Code from the criminal justice system whenever possible and to reduce the possibility of their committing future law violations through the provision of social and rehabilitative services to such juveniles and their families.” Because the foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is to promote and protect the juvenile’s best interests, statutes under the juvenile code must be liberally construed to serve the best interests of the juveniles who fall within it.
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the provisions of §43-2,106.03, which states:
Any time after the disposition of a juvenile described in subdivision (1), (2), (3)(b), or (4) of section 43-247, upon the motion of any party or the court on its own motion, a hearing may be held regarding the amenability of the juvenile to the rehabilitative services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The court may enter an order, based upon evidence presented at the hearing, finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative services that can be provided under the Nebraska Juvenile Code. The reasons for such a finding shall be stated in the order. Such an order shall be considered by the county attorney in making a future determination under section 43-276 regarding such juvenile and by the court when considering a future transfer motion under section 29-1816 or 43-274 or any future charge or petition regarding such juvenile.
Johnny does not challenge the State’s ability to request an amenability hearing under §43-2,106.03, since he is a juvenile as described in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3)(b) of §43-247 and the motions at issue were filed after dispositional orders had been entered in his juvenile cases. But he contends it was error for the juvenile court to find him nonamenable and to terminate probation and jurisdiction based on such finding. The State disagrees; it contends that the finding of nonamenability was supported by the evidence, and it argues that the unsuccessful termination of probation and jurisdiction was “the logical result” of such findings.
In arguing their respective positions, the parties disagree regarding the proper meaning, scope, and application of §43-2,106.03. They urge different interpretations of the term “amenability” and disagree on the meaning of the phrase “not amenable to rehabilitative services.” And although they agree that the State had the burden to prove nonamenability on this record, they disagree as to the quantum of proof required to carry that burden. Finally, the parties’ reasoning differs on whether a finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03 can support a change in disposition.
(a) Meaning of Amenability to Rehabilitative Services
The Nebraska Legislature has not defined the term “amenability” for purposes of §43-2,106.03, nor has it identified any factors to be considered when determining whether a juvenile is “not amenable to rehabilitative services” under that statute. At oral argument before the Court, both parties referred to dictionary definitions of “amenable.” The Court outlines the various definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary, and Merriam-Webster dictionary.
Because courts construing a statute must also determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature, and because “the primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute,” the Court also looks to the plain language of §43-2,106.03 to discern its purpose. 43-2,106.03 mandates how, when, and by whom any orders finding nonamenability must be considered, and it directs that county attorneys shall consider such orders “in making a future determination under 43-276 regarding such juvenile” and that courts shall consider such orders “when considering a future transfer motion under section 29-1816 or 43-274 or any future
charge or petition regarding such juvenile.” The Court discerns from this language that the primary purpose of §43-2,106.03 is to provide prosecutors and courts with predictive information to consider when making future filing, charging, and transfer decisions involving the juvenile. The legislative history, while not dispositive, also supports this purpose.
Considering the common definitions of the term “amenable” and the Legislature’s purpose for enacting §43-2,106.03, the Court holds the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “amenability” refers to the likelihood that a particular juvenile will respond effectively in the future to the type of rehabilitative services that can be provided under the juvenile code. Relatedly, “a juvenile who is not amenable to rehabilitative services” refers to a juvenile who, based on the evidence presented, is unlikely to respond effectively in the future to the rehabilitative services that can be provided under the juvenile code.
In addition to briefing the meaning of “amenability” under §43-2,106.03, the parties have proposed specific factors they think juvenile courts should, and should not, consider when ruling on such motions. The Legislature sometimes identifies factors that juvenile courts should consider when making certain determinations, but it has not prescribed any specific factors to be considered when determining amenability under §43-2,106.03, and the Court finds it unnecessary to judicially limit the court’s analysis to a specific list of factors. A finding of nonamenability is necessarily fact specific, and because §43-2,106.03 requires the juvenile court to state the reasons for any such finding in its order, the specific factors relied upon by the court in each case will be apparent from the order itself and available for review by all who are required to consider the order, including any appellate court.
(b) Burden and Quantum of Proof
43-2,106.03 authorizes any party or the court on its own motion to move for an evidentiary hearing regarding the amenability of the juvenile to the rehabilitative services that can be provided under the juvenile code. But the statute is silent regarding who bears the burden of proof at such a hearing, and it does not address the degree of proof required to carry that burden.
The parties contend that because the State was the party that filed the motions seeking a finding of nonamenability, it was the State’s burden to prove the same. The Court agrees and holds that when the State files a motion under §43-2,106.03 requesting a finding that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitative services, the State bears the burden of proving nonamenability. The Court leaves for another day consideration of which party bears the burden of proof when either the court or the juvenile requests a hearing on amenability, as that issue is not before the Court.
The parties also disagree on the quantum of proof required at an amenability hearing under §43-2,106.03. Johnny argues that a juvenile’s amenability should be established by clear and convincing evidence, reasoning that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is “too high of a hurdle” and a preponderance of the evidence standard is “too low.” The State argues that a juvenile’s amenability should be established by the same “preponderance standard used in other civil-type juvenile proceedings.”
Although §43-2,106.03 does not expressly identify the quantum of proof required in a postdispositional hearing to determine a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitative services, guidance can be found in other provisions of the juvenile code addressing similar hearings. For instance, §43-286(1) governs postdispositional hearings to determine whether a juvenile “has exhausted all levels of probation supervision and options for community-based services” and should be placed at a youth rehabilitation and treatment center, and it states the burden is upon the State by a preponderance of the evidence at such a hearing. Absent statutory language requiring a different standard of proof, Nebraska courts in civil cases generally apply the preponderance standard. The Court therefore holds that in hearings pursuant to §43-2,106.03, which are civil in nature, a juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitative services must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Arguments on Appeal
Johnny assigns error to the juvenile court’s nonamenability determination and to its decision to terminate probation and jurisdiction “unsuccessfully” based on the nonamenability determination.
(a) No Abuse of Discretion in Nonamenability Determination
Johnny argues the juvenile court erred in finding him nonamenable, but he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as it regards the type of rehabilitative services that can be provided in the juvenile court. Instead, he argues the evidence showed that he either completed, or was in the process of completing, every rehabilitative service and condition ordered by the court as part of his probation, and he suggests this shows that he “would have been amenable to completing additional in-home services in the future. Johnny argues that the juvenile court’s emphasis on evidence of his continued criminal conduct and new law violations while on probation was improper for two reasons. First, he argues the juvenile court inaccurately described some of his adjudicated and charged offenses and mischaracterized some of his behavior as violent when it was merely aggressive. Alternatively, he argues that his criminal conduct while on probation was irrelevant to an amenability determination under §43-2,106.03.
The State disagrees. It argues that the purpose of the amenability hearing was to evaluate whether the rehabilitative services available under the Juvenile Code had any reasonable chance of success with Johnny. According to the State, “how a juvenile has progressed or failed while being offered juvenile services is the best evidence and indicator in determining whether they’ll be amenable to additional or alternative services” in the juvenile court in the future. The State argues that the evidence adduced at the hearing established that despite being provided rehabilitative services, Johnny was not making progress towards meaningful rehabilitation and was continuing to commit further crimes and that therefore, the juvenile court did not err in its nonamenability determination.
In its written orders, the juvenile court stated several reasons for finding that Johnny is not amenable to the rehabilitative services that can be provided in the juvenile court, including, but
not limited to, the following: Johnny’s adjudicated offenses included acts of violence; the juvenile court had been providing resources and services for more than two years in an attempt to rehabilitate the juvenile; while on probation, Johnny had numerous periods of detention, and he “continues to violate court orders, the conditions of his probation, and has had his juvenile probation revoked in the past.”
These reasons are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and they are sufficiently probative of an amenability determination under §43-2,106.03, which is focused on the likelihood that the juvenile will respond effectively in the future to the type of rehabilitative services available in the juvenile court. On this record, the Court cannot say the juvenile court’s determination of nonamenability was based on reasons that were untenable or unreasonable, nor can the Court say its determination of nonamenability was clearly against justice, conscience, reason, or evidence.
Because the Court’s de novo review shows no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s nonamenability determination under §43-2,106.03, it rejects Johnny’s first assignment of error. But that does not end the analysis, because the juvenile court relied on the nonamenability finding to modify the disposition in each of Johnny’s pending juvenile cases. The Court turns to that issue next and ultimately concludes the juvenile court plainly erred in changing the dispositional orders based solely on a finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03.
(b) Plain Error in Changing Dispositions
Pursuant to Neb. Const. art. V, §27, the juvenile court is a statutorily created tribunal established by the Legislature with such powers as the Legislature may provide. As a statutorily created court of limited jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only the authority conferred upon it by statute. Consequently, when considering whether a juvenile court acted within its authority, an appellate court will look to the authority conferred by statute. With these principles in mind, the Court considers whether the juvenile court’s finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03 authorized it to modify the dispositions by terminating probation and jurisdiction.
Where a juvenile has been adjudicated under §43-247(1), (2), or 3(b), the dispositional options available to the juvenile court are set out in §43-286(1)(a) and (3). And once a dispositional order has been entered, the juvenile court’s authority to modify that disposition is limited by §43-286(6), which provides:
(6)(a) Except as provided in subdivision (6)(b) of this section, the court shall not change a disposition unless the court finds that the juvenile has violated a term or condition of probation or supervision or an order of the court and the procedures in subdivision (5)(b) of this section have been satisfied.
(b) Upon motion of the juvenile, the court may modify the terms or conditions of probation or supervision or modify a dispositional order if: (i) All parties stipulate to the particular modification; and (ii) The juvenile has consulted with counsel or has waived
counsel. Any waiver must be particular to the modification and shall comply with section 43-3102.
Additionally, §43-286.01provides, in relevant part:
(8) During the term of probation, the court, on application of a probation officer or of the juvenile or on its own motion, may reduce or eliminate any of the conditions imposed on the juvenile. Upon completion of the term of probation or the earlier discharge of the juvenile, the juvenile shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and his or her record shall be sealed pursuant to 43-2,108.04.
Nebraska appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of complying with the applicable statutory procedures when modifying a dispositional order, and the case law (In re Interest of Josue G., In re Interest of Iyana P., In re Interest of Nowa K.) is clear that once a juvenile court enters a dispositional order of probation, it is not authorized to change the terms or conditions of probation unless the applicable statutory procedures are followed.
Here, the juvenile court relied exclusively on its nonamenability finding under §43-2,106.03 as the authority to modify the dispositional orders in each case by terminating probation, and the court’s jurisdiction, “unsuccessfully.” There is no language in §43-2,106.03, or in any other statute in the juvenile code, that authorizes a juvenile court to modify a disposition based solely on a finding of nonamenability.
In §43-286(6), the Legislature has expressly prohibited juvenile courts from changing a disposition unless either the court finds the juvenile has violated a term or condition of probation or an order of the court and the procedures in §43-286(5)(b) have been satisfied, or the juvenile has filed a motion to modify under §43-286(6)(b) and all parties stipulate to the particular modification. Neither procedure was followed in this case. And although the Legislature, in §43-286.01(8), has expressly authorized juvenile courts to “reduce or eliminate” a condition of probation upon the application of either the juvenile, the probation officer, or the court, no such application appears in the appellate record.
Because the record in these consolidated appeals does not reflect that the juvenile court had any statutory authority to modify the dispositions, all such modifications must be vacated for plain error and the matters remanded to the juvenile court.
Conclusion:
Upon the Nebraska Supreme Court’s de novo review of the record, it finds no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s determination under §43-2,106.03 that Johnny is not amenable to the rehabilitative services that can be provided under the juvenile code. But the Court finds the juvenile court plainly erred in terminating probation and jurisdiction based on that determination, because the Legislature has not given juvenile courts authority to modify dispositional orders based solely on a finding of nonamenability under §43-2,106.03. The Nebraska Supreme Court therefore affirms that portion of the juvenile court’s orders finding nonamenability, and vacates the remainder of the orders and remands the causes to the juvenile court for further proceedings.