IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
(Memorandum Web Opinion)

STATE V. JENNINGS

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STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,

V.

JESSIE J. JENNINGS, APPELLANT.

Filed November 10, 2026. No. A-26-063.

Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: ANDREA D. MILLER, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael W. Meister, Scotts Bluff County Public Defender, for appellant.

Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and P. Christian Adamski for appellee.

RIEDMANN, Chief Judge, and BISHOP and WELCH, Judges.

BISHOP, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Following a jury trial, Jessie J. Jennings was convicted of enticement by electronic communication device, possession of child pornography, child abuse, and contributing to the delinquency of a child. The Scotts Bluff County District Court sentenced him to an aggregate of 9 to 12 months' imprisonment, followed by 12 months' post-release supervision. On appeal, Jennings does not challenge his conviction for possession of child pornography, but he claims that there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions for the other three crimes. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On August 5, 2025, the State filed an amended information charging Jennings with four counts: count I, enticement by electronic communication device, a Class IV felony, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-833 (Reissue 2016); count II, possession of child pornography, a Class IIA

felony, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-813.01 (Cum. Supp. 2024); count III, "child abuse, knowingly and intentionally," a Class IIIA felony, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707(4) (Cum. Supp. 2024); and count IV, "[c]ontributing to [d]elinquency," a Class I misdemeanor, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-709 (Reissue 2016).

A jury trial was held on September 15 and 16, 2025.

Abigail Wilson, 29 years old, testified that she knows Jennings and Jaiden F.; each is a "[f]amily friend." Wilson lives in Minatare, Nebraska. According to Wilson, "kids" were often at her house to "hang out" with her 15-year-old niece and they were about the same age. Wilson recalled a van ride with several teenagers, including Jaiden, Jennings, and Jennings' sister (age 14). She said that on a Friday night "between February and March," "we went cruising." Some of the kids had been at her house in Minatare, but "we went and picked up [Jennings]" from his place in Terrytown, Nebraska; "[Jennings' sister] asked [him] if he wanted to hang out and go cruising." Wilson confirmed that there had been some discussion about Jaiden's age. She said, "Jaiden had told [Jennings] before we left that he was 18," "[a]nd I had told [Jennings] that Jaiden, he was not 18, he was 15." When Wilson corrected Jaiden, "He said that he was sorry for lying and he should have never told [Jennings] that he was 18." When asked how often Jennings was at her house when she had other younger kids around, Wilson replied, "Not at all," "[h]e was only there one time, and that was the night we went cruising."

Wilson testified that in April 2025, Jaiden came to her and said that Jennings had sent him some messages, and Wilson "said that he needed to take it to his mom." Wilson took Jaiden "straight over to his house in Scottsbluff and gave him to his mom." Wilson told Jaiden's mother "that there was [sic] messages between [Jennings] and Jaiden that needed to be looked at and that it was something between her and [Jennings'] mom that needed to be tooken [sic] care of."

Devan C. testified that she and her son, Jaiden, lived in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Jaiden was currently 15 years old. In April 2025, "Abbie" showed Devan "some messages" that Abbie had "screenshotted" from Jaiden's phone. Abbie "told me that the guy . . . Jaiden was speaking with was an adult." Devan then went to the sheriff's office and "showed them the phone." She said "[t]hey took pictures of the screenshots on another camera and then also took the phone into custody."

Deputy John Velke, of the Scotts Bluff County sheriff's office, testified that Devan came to the sheriff's office on April 24, 2025, with concerns about messages she found on a phone being used by her son. Deputy Velke reviewed and photographed the messages on the phone, and then "turned [the phone] over to investigations to be placed into evidence." The photographs taken by Deputy Velke appear in exhibit 4.

Jaiden testified that the messages in exhibit 4 were Snapchat messages between him and Jennings from April 2025. Jaiden first met Jennings about 2 months prior to that when "[w]e all were riding in Abbie's van." When asked if Jaiden told Jennings how old he was, Jaiden responded, "Yes," "I told him I was 15." Jaiden denied ever telling Jennings that he was 18 years old.

Exhibit 4 contains pictures of a phone with messages exchanged between Jennings and Jaiden. The first message was sent by Jaiden on "April 6th," and Jennings responded that same day, with a second response on "April 7th."

> [Jaiden:] Heyy It is Jessica's . . . bff
>
> [Jennings:] ??? What

[Jennings:] Who is this

The two then messaged back and forth about a girl Jennings had dated. The messages then progressed.

[Jennings:] I am not going to give you her snap
[Jaiden:] I don't want it
. . . .
[Jennings:] And her and I made a deal
[Jaiden:] Wydm
[Jennings:] Don't date each other ex's or crushes
[Jaiden:] Ok
[Jennings:] Which technically you are my ex
[Jaiden:] Y we never dated r yu saying sumn Du you want tu
[Jennings:] no offense but you can't handle me
. . . .

The two also exchanged messages on "April 17th."

[Jaiden:] . . . I'm at abbies House [image]
[Jennings:] oh ok
[Jaiden:] R u good
[Jennings:] Yea
[Jennings:] Chilling with friends
[Jaiden:] Same
. . . .
[Jennings:] Hey I have been thinking
[Jaiden:] About what?
[Jennings:] You said you like me right
[Jaiden:] Ye
[Jennings:] And I kinda want something
[Jaiden:] What du Yu want
[Jennings:] Some one to make me cum but sadly you can't rub my cock because I am not there
[Jaiden:] Omg let me com eover . . . I won't jus rub it I'll ride it
[Jennings:] Can't
[Jaiden:] Y
[Jennings:] Every one else is still asleep
[Jaiden:] Let me see your cock And I'll let Yu see mine

(Although the images do not appear in exhibit 4, both Jaiden and an investigator testified that Jennings sent a picture of his penis to Jaiden, and Jaiden sent a picture of his penis in return.) The continued message exchange contained the following:

[Jennings:] Good sized
[Jaiden:] I'm not even hard in that

[Jennings:] Oh
[Jaiden:] Ye
[Jennings:] If I was home alone I would have you meet me by the north plat bridge so I can fuck you
[Jaiden:] Are Yu single
[Jennings:] It is kinda iffy rn
[Jaiden:] I fell yu Well if Yu ever wanna [fuck] I'm down

The message exchange continued in a sexual manner. Jennings confirmed that Jaiden was currently in Minatare. Then,

[Jennings:] maybe when school starts up again you could have Abby drop you off at the zoo and walk down to the bridge and I can be there waiting for you
[Jaiden:] Yes Idk know If my momm will let me tho
[Jennings:] You just bet not tell anyone about it
[Jaiden:] I won't obvi
. . . .
[Jennings:] Just say you are going for a walk

Jennings and Jaiden then messaged back and forth about directions to "the bridge" and Jennings messaged, "[S]it on the cement beams for the bridge till I get there and idc if you play with yourself while you wait[.]" No specific date or time for the meet up appears in the messages.

During his testimony, Jaiden confirmed that he and Jennings exchanged photos of their penises. And Jaiden confirmed that exhibits 5, 6, and 7 were true and accurate copies of the photos they exchanged in Snapchat. When asked if they ever actually met up, Jaiden replied, "No."

Investigator Matthew Shannon, of the Scotts Bluff County sheriff's office, testified that he and another investigator interviewed Jennings on May 1, 2025. The interview was recorded and received in evidence as exhibit 9. During the interview, Jennings said that Jaiden told him he was 18 years old. Jennings also gave his own date of birth as June 2005.

Investigator Shannon said he took Jennings' phone, got the passcode for it, packaged the phone into evidence, and "wrote a warrant for a search warrant for the TCD, Technical Crimes Division." Deputy Velke had done the same with the phone Jaiden had, and Investigator Shannon delivered both phones to the "TCD lab" in North Platte, Nebraska. (A digital forensics examiner with the Nebraska State Patrol Technical Crimes Unit testified about the procedure and program she used to extract data and generate a report. The extractions and reports were put on two hard drives and sent back to the Scotts Bluff County sheriff's office.) Investigator Shannon stated that "the lab" downloaded the data onto two hard drives, "[o]ne is a working copy and one goes into evidence permanently." He "began going through the download of the working copy," but then "Investigator Jackson went ahead and took over going through the working copy."

Investigator James Jackson, of the Scotts Bluff County Attorney's office, testified that he received the hard drive from Investigator Shannon and then reviewed the data. Investigator Jackson was "looking for evidence of a conversation between Mr. Jennings and [Jaiden] and then any digital images that were sent between the two." He was able to locate the digital images of Jennings' penis (exhibit 5) and Jaiden's penis (exhibit 6); exhibit 7 is a report for the image in

exhibit 6. Investigator Jackson confirmed that exhibits 5, 6, and 7 were true and accurate copies of what was on the working copy of the hard drive. He said that exhibit 5 is "the actual picture that was sent by [Jennings] to [Jaiden]," and exhibit 6 was the image Jaiden sent to Jennings. Investigator Jackson was able to confirm that the images were exchanged via Snapchat, and that Jennings actually received the photograph of Jaiden's penis. On cross-examination, Investigator Jackson answered in the negative when asked if Jaiden sent his photo to Jennings first. Regarding the order that the photos were received, "[Jennings] sent a photograph to Jaiden," "[a]nd then shortly after that [Jennings] asks for a picture of Jaiden's penis and then he sends it to him." But Investigator Jackson confirmed that it started with Jaiden asking Jennings to send him a picture.

Investigator Shannon testified (on cross-examination) that he met Jaiden for a forensic interview on April 30, 2025. Investigator Shannon answered in the negative when asked if he found anything indicating that "[Jennings] had either cruelly confined or cruelly punished Jaiden"; "[Jennings] depriv[ed] Jaiden of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or care"; "Jaiden was sexually abused physically"; or "Jennings was trying to traffic Jaiden." Investigator Shannon did find evidence indicating that Jennings tried to solicit Jaiden. On redirect examination, the investigator was asked, "Based on your investigation, did [Jennings] permit [Jaiden] to be placed in a situation to be sexually abused?" Investigator Shannon replied, "Yes."

Jennings' sister (age 14) testified that she went "cruising" in the van with Abbie, Jaiden, Jennings, and others. "Jaiden said that he was 18." When Jennings' sister said, "That's not what I was told," "[Jaiden] was like, Well, I was lying to everyone but [Jennings]." According to Jennings' sister, Abbie told Jennings that Jaiden was 15. But then Jaiden again told Jennings that he was 18 when they were "in the back of the van."

The jury found Jennings guilty of all four counts and the district court accepted the jury's verdict.

On January 22, 2026, the district court sentenced Jennings to 9 to 12 months' imprisonment on each of the four counts, followed by 12 months' post-release supervision on counts I and III, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jennings was to receive 267 days of credit for time already served against the aggregate of all terms imposed. Jennings was also notified of his registration responsibilities under the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act.

Jennings appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Jennings assigns that the district court erred in finding the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions for enticement by electronic communication device, child abuse, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. *State v. Liech*, 320 Neb. 843, 30 N.W.3d 847 (2026). The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.*

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. *State v. Mielak*, 321 Neb. 542, 35 N.W.3d 798 (2026).

ANALYSIS

ENTICEMENT BY ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION DEVICE

Jennings claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for enticement by electronic communication device.

Section 28-833 states:

> (1) A person commits the offense of enticement by electronic communication device if he or she is nineteen years of age or over and knowingly and intentionally utilizes an electronic communication device to contact a child under sixteen years of age or a peace officer who is believed by such person to be a child under sixteen years of age and in so doing:
>
> (a) Uses or transmits any indecent, lewd, lascivious, or obscene language, writing, or sound;
>
> (b) Transmits or otherwise disseminates any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct as defined in section 28-1463.02; or
>
> (c) Offers or solicits any indecent, lewd, or lascivious act.
>
> . . . .
>
> (3) Enticement by electronic communication device is deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication was initiated or where it was received.
>
> (4) For purposes of this section, electronic communication device means any device which, in its ordinary and intended use, transmits by electronic means writings, sounds, visual images, or data of any nature to another electronic communication device.

Where the prosecution under § 28-833 involves a minor child rather than a decoy, a defendant's knowledge that the recipient is under age 16 is an element of the crime of enticement by electronic communication device. *State v. Paez*, 302 Neb. 676, 925 N.W.2d 75 (2019).

The jury was instructed on relevant definitions as follows.

> **Obscene** shall mean (a) that an average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, material, conduct, or live performance taken as a whole predominately appeals to the prurient interest or a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.
>
> **Lascivious** is defined as tending to excite lust; lewd; indecent; obscene; sexual impurity; tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations.
>
> **Lewd** is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous.
>
> . . . .
>
> **Sexually explicit conduct** means: . . . (e) erotic nudity for the purpose of sexual gratification or sexual stimulation of one or more of the person [sic] involved.

(Emphasis in original).

Jennings specifically takes issue with phrase "'to contact'" in § 28-833(1), which "has no statutory or legal definition." Brief for appellant at 14.

When terms in a statute are not specifically defined by the Legislature, our principles of statutory interpretation generally require courts to give such terms their plain and ordinary meaning. *State v. Mielak, supra*. But when the Legislature has defined specific terms for the purpose of the Nebraska Criminal Code, courts will apply such definitions unless the context requires otherwise. *Id.* In construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. *Id.* It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. *Id.* In construing a statute, appellate courts are guided by the presumption that the Legislature intended a sensible rather than absurd result in enacting the statute. *State v. Russell*, 291 Neb. 33, 863 N.W.2d 813 (2015).

"Contact" can be a noun, verb, adjective, or adverb. See Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 315 (1989). One of the definitions of "contact" as a noun is "a condition in which two or more individuals or groups are placed in communication with each other." *Id.* Definitions of "contact" as a verb are "to put or bring into contact," "to communicate with (a person)," and "to enter into or be in contact." *Id*.

Jennings argues that

> [i]n this case, "contact" is a verb. Verbs require both a subject and an object. Subjects act, and objects are acted upon. In this case, the defendant is the subject, and the minor child is the object. The plain and ordinary meaning of this statute is that the subject defendant must use an electronic device to contact the object minor child.

Brief for appellant at 14. Jennings claims that he "was not the party to make contact; [Jaiden] was." *Id.* And, "While Mr. Jennings ultimately responded to the contact made by [Jaiden] it seems that criminalizing a response to an unsolicited message would be an "'absurd result'" unintended by the legislature." *Id.*

The State, however, argues that the plain language of the statute does not require that Jennings initiated the contact. It notes that "'contact'" as a verb is synonymous with "'communicate with.'" Brief for appellee at 14. Additionally, "the Legislature has demonstrated that when it intends to limit liability based on who initiates a conversation, it knows how to do so." *Id.* at 15. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat § 48-2604(2)(a) (Reissue 2021) (before being issued certificate of registration, individual may act as athlete agent for all purposes except signing agency contract if "student-athlete . . . initiates communication with the individual"). "Finally, Jennings's interpretation yields absurd results that defeat the statute's purpose" and "would also force courts into arbitrary, unworkable line-drawing exercises to determine when a text communication constitutes a new 'contact.'" Brief for appellee at 15-16. We agree with the State.

In this case, Jennings and Jaiden used their phones to exchange sexual messages, including discussions about having sex, and they exchanged pictures of their penises via Snapchat. Jennings was 19 years old at the time and Jaiden was 15 years old. Although Jennings and his sister both claimed that Jaiden told Jennings that he was 18 years old, Jaiden testified that he told Jennings he

was 15 years old. Additionally, Wilson testified that she told Jennings that Jaiden was 15. By finding Jennings guilty of enticement by electronic communication device, the jury clearly found that Jennings knew Jaiden was 15. See *State v. Liech*, 320 Neb. 843, 30 N.W.3d 847 (2026) (appellate court does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence; such matters are for finder of fact).

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of enticement by electronic communication device.

CHILD ABUSE

Jennings claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for "Child Abuse, Knowingly and Intentionally."

Pursuant to § 28-707,

> (1) A person commits child abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently causes or permits a minor child to be:
>
> (a) Placed in a situation that endangers his or her life or physical or mental health;
>
> (b) Cruelly confined or cruelly punished;
>
> (c) Deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or care;
>
> (d) Placed in a situation to be sexually exploited through sex trafficking of a minor as defined in section 28-830 or by allowing, encouraging, or forcing such minor child to engage in debauchery, public indecency, or obscene or pornographic photography, films, or depictions;
>
> (e) Placed in a situation to be sexually abused as defined in section 28-319, 28-319.01, or 28-320.01; or
>
> (f) Placed in a situation to be a trafficking victim as defined in section 28-830.
>
> . . . .
>
> (4) Child abuse is a Class IIIA felony if the offense is committed knowingly and intentionally and does not result in serious bodily injury as defined in section 28-109 or death.

The charging language in the amended information and the jury instructions in this case encompassed language from § 28-707(1)(a) and (e).

Section 28-707(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person commits child abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently causes or permits a minor child to be: (a) Placed in a situation that endangers his or her life or physical or mental health." "Endangers" for purposes of § 28-707(1)(a) means to expose a minor child's life or health to danger or the peril of probable harm or loss. *State v. Ferguson*, 301 Neb. 697, 919 N.W.2d 863 (2018). The purpose of criminalizing conduct under the statute is that where a child is endangered, it may be injured; it is the likelihood of injury against which the statute speaks. *Id.* Criminal endangerment in § 28-707(1)(a) encompasses not only conduct directed at the child but also conduct which presents the likelihood of injury due to the child's having been placed in a situation caused by the defendant's conduct. *State v. Ferguson, supra*.

Section § 28-707(1)(e) references Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-319, 28-319.01, and 28-320.01 (Reissue 2016). Sections 28-319 (first degree sexual assault) and 28-319.01 (first degree sexual assault of child) require penetration. And § 28-320.01 (second and third degree sexual assault of child) requires sexual contact. Sexual contact requires touching. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318(5) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (definition of sexual contact).

Jennings notes that the jury was not instructed as to the definition of sexual abuse, and "[e]ven had the jury been instructed on these definitions, the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jennings' actions placed [Jaiden] in such a situation" because there was no penetration or sexual contact. Brief for appellant at 10. "While there were discussions about meeting up, no such meet up transpired, and no attempts to meet up were made by either party." *Id*. at 11.

Jennings also argues that "the State presented no evidence that [Jennings] placed [Jaiden] in a situation where the risk of harm to his physical or mental health was likely." *Id.* at 9. "[T]his case involves two teen-aged males mutually engaged in sexual exploration without any indication of harm or potential harm to [Jaiden]." *Id*. at 10.

The State, however, argues that the evidence was sufficient to support the child abuse conviction. The State points out that the evidence showed that Jennings and Jaiden talked about having sex and exchanged pictures of their penises. It notes that by criminalizing certain acts, e.g. possession of child pornography, the Legislature "implicitly established that such conduct harms minors like [Jaiden]." Brief for appellee at 9. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-102 (Reissue 2016) ("The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are: (1) To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interest . . .").

Here, Jennings engaged in sexually charged Snapchat messages with Jaiden wherein they discussed their desire to engage in sexual acts, and they exchanged pictures of their penises. Whether such conduct by Jennings endangered Jaiden's mental health was up to the jury to decide. See *State v. Knutson*, 288 Neb. 823, 852 N.W.2d 307 (2014) (sufficiency of evidence under § 28-701(a); triers of fact may apply to the subject before them that general knowledge which any person must be presumed to have).

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of "child abuse, knowingly and intentionally" under § 28-707(1)(a).

Because we find sufficient evidence for a violation of § 28-707(1)(a), we need not consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt under § 28-707(1)(e). See *State v. Knutson, supra* (judgment will be affirmed if sufficient to support any of State's alternative theories of guilt). In *Knutson*, the jury instruction reflected the State's alternative theories of child abuse, which corresponded to § 28-707(1)(a), (d), and (e). The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that because the evidence was sufficient to show a violation of § 28-707(1)(a), it did not consider whether it was sufficient to support the State's alternative theories of guilt.

CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY OF CHILD

Jennings claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

Pursuant to § 28-709,

> (1) Any person who, by any act, encourages, causes, or contributes to the delinquency or need for special supervision of a child under eighteen years of age, so that such child becomes, or will tend to become, a delinquent child, or a child in need of special supervision, commits contributing to the delinquency of a child.
>
> (2) The following definitions shall be applicable to this section:
>
> (a) Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance; and
>
> (b) A child in need of special supervision shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years (i) who, by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient, is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian, or custodian; (ii) who is habitually truant from school or home; or (iii) who deports himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health of himself or others.

Jennings argues, "There is zero evidence that [his] actions encouraged, caused, contributed to, or even enhanced the likelihood of [Jaiden's] delinquency, and likewise, no evidence of delinquency or likelihood of delinquency exists in then record for [Jaiden]." Brief for appellant at 12. Additionally, "No evidence was presented that [Jaiden] was wayward or habitually disobedient, uncontrollable, truant, or dangerous in any way to himself or others as a result of his interactions with Mr. Jennings." *Id.*

The State contends the evidence was sufficient to show that Jennings encouraged, caused, or contributed to the need for special supervision of Jaiden. "First, Jennings encouraged [Jaiden] to behave in a way that endangered the morals or health of himself or others by encouraging [Jaiden] to engage in illegal sexual conduct with him . . . conduct that the Legislature has decided is harmful and should not be permitted." Brief for appellee at 11. "Second, Jennings encouraged [Jaiden] to be disobedient and lie to his parents." *Id.* at 12.

Section 28-709 is addressed to the conduct of the person accused of contributing to the delinquency of a child, not the conduct of the child. *State v. Brister*, 231 Neb. 263, 435 N.W.2d 679 (1989). "The statute does not require that the child actually become delinquent or in need of special supervision, but only that the defendant encourage the child to become delinquent or to need special supervision so that the child will 'tend to become a delinquent child or a child in need of special supervision.'" *Id.* at 266, 435 N.W.2d at 681.

In this case, as previously stated, Jennings engaged in sexually charged messages with 15-year-old Jaiden. The two discussed their desire to engage in sexual acts and they exchanged pictures of their penises. When the two discussed meeting up in the future to have sex, Jaiden stated that he did not know if his mother would let him out of the house; Jennings then encouraged Jaiden to be deceptive about where he was going.

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of "contributing to delinquency."

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we find there was sufficient evidence to support Jennings' convictions for enticement by electronic communication device, child abuse, and contributing to the delinquency of a child. We therefore affirm Jennings' convictions.

AFFIRMED.